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Abstract
Rapid advancements in human neuroscience and neurotechnology open unprecedented
possibilities for accessing, collecting, sharing and manipulating information from the
human brain. Such applications raise important challenges to human rights principles
that need to be addressed to prevent unintended consequences. This paper assesses
the implications of emerging neurotechnology applications in the context of the human
rights framework and suggests that existing human rights may not be sufficient to
respond to these emerging issues. After analysing the relationship between
neuroscience and human rights, we identify four new rights that may become
of great relevance in the coming decades: the right to cognitive liberty, the right
to mental privacy, the right to mental integrity, and the right to psychological
continuity.
Thou canst not touch the freedom of my mind
John Milton
Introduction
The quotation in the epigraph is from the play Comus, written by John Milton in 1634.
The piece, an exhortation to virtue, follows the story a young noblewoman who has
been abducted by a sorcerer called Comus. He has bounded her to an enchanted chair
and tried to seduce her with arguments about the charm of bodily pleasure. Despite all
his rhetorical assaults, the woman repeatedly refuses his advances and claims that, no matter
what he does or says, she will continue to assert her freedom of mind, which is beyond his
physical power. In the end, she is rescued by her brothers, who chase off Comus.
The quoted sentence conveys the idea that the mind is a kind of last refuge of
personal freedom and self-determination. While the body can easily be subject to
domination and control by others, our mind, along with our thoughts, beliefs and
convictions, are to a large extent beyond external constraint. Yet, with advances in
neural engineering, brain imaging and pervasive neurotechnology, the mind might no
longer be such unassailable fortress. As we will explain in this paper, emerging neuro-
technologies have the potential to allow access to at least some components of mental
information. While these advances can be greatly beneficial for individuals and society,
they can also be misused and create unprecedented threats to the freedom of the mind
and to the individuals' capacity to freely govern their behavior.
In the research context, brain imaging techniques are widely used to understand the
functioning of the human brain and detect the neural correlates of mental states and
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behavior. Clinical applications of brain imaging as well as other neurotechnologies are
significantly improving the well-being of patients suffering from neurological disorders,
offering new preventive, diagnostic and therapeutic tools. Outside the clinics, pervasive
commercial applications are rapidly providing new possibilities for self-quantification,
cognitive enhancement, personalized communication and entertainment for normal
users. Furthermore, a number of neurotechnology applications are becoming of major
interest in the legal domain, especially tort law, criminal law and law enforcement.
On the other hand, these same technologies, if misused or inadequately implemented,
risk creating unparalleled forms of intrusion into people’s private sphere, potentially caus-
ing physical or psychological harm, or allowing undue influence on people’s behavior.
This paper makes the case that the possibilities opened up by neurotechnological de-
velopments and their application to various aspects of human life will force a reconcep-
tualization of certain human rights, or even the creation of new rights to protect
people from potential harm.
In 2013, US President Obama called attention to the potential impact of neuroscience
on human rights, emphasizing the need to address questions such as those
“(…) relating to privacy, personal agency, and moral responsibility for one’s actions;
questions about stigmatization and discrimination based on neurological measures of
intelligence or other traits; and questions about the appropriate use of neuroscience in the
criminal-justice system” (Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues, 2014).
This article begins by exploring the current possibilities and challenges of neurotech-
nology, and considers what neurotechnological trends will drive this ethical and legal
reconceptualization. After carefully analyzing the relationship between neuroscience
and human rights, this paper identifies four new rights that may become of relevance
in the coming decades: the right to cognitive liberty, the right to mental privacy, the
right to mental integrity, and the right to psychological continuity.
The neurotechnology revolution
For a long time, the boundaries of the skull have been generally considered the
separation line between the observable and unobservable dimension of the living
human being. In fact, although primitive forms of neurosurgery used in ancient
societies, including pseudo-scientific procedures such as trepanation, could allow for
the observation and even manipulation (e.g. selective removal) of brain tissue, yet the
neural and mental processes run in the brain and underlying emotions, reasoning and
behavior remained at length unobservable. In contrast, modern advancements in
neuroscience and neurotechnology have progressively allowed for the unlocking of the
human brain and provided insights into brain processes as well as their link to, respect-
ively, mental states and observable behavior. In 1878 Richard Canton discovered the
transmission of electrical signals through an animal’s brain. Forty-six years later, the
first human electroencephalography (EEG) was recorded. Since then, a neurotechnolo-
gical revolution has taken place inside and outside the clinics. In the 1990s, sometimes
referred to as the ‘decade of the brain’, the use of imaging techniques for neurobehav-
ioral studies increased dramatically (Illes 2003). Today, as a wide and rapidly expanding
spectrum of neuroimaging technologies has become clinically and commercially
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available, the non-invasive recording and display of patterns of brain activity (often
associated with the completion of physical or cognitive tasks) has become standard
practice. For example, EEG recordings are being widely used to non-invasively measure
electrical activity of the brain and detect voltage fluctuations. In addition, derivatives of
the EEG technique such as evoked potentials (EPs) and event-related potentials (ERP)
allow to average EEG responses to the presentation and processing of stimuli, hence to
record brain signals during the performance of specific sensory, cognitive or motor
processes. Another technique, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), allows to
measure brain’s electrical activity indirectly, i.e. by using hemodynamic responses (cere-
bral blood flow) as indirect markers. Current fMRI techniques can localize brain activ-
ity, graphically display patterns of brain activation, and determine their intensity by
color-coding the strength of activation. fMRI techniques are implemented for a variety
of purposes including pre-surgery risk assessment, and functional mapping of brain
areas to detect abnormalities (e.g. left-right hemispherical asymmetry in language and
memory regions) or to observe post-stroke or post-surgery recovery, as well as the ef-
fects of pharmacological and behavioral therapies. In addition, a number of neuro-
logical conditions including depression and Alzheimer’s disease can now be diagnosed
with the use of fMRI (Koch et al. 2012).
The capacity of neuroimaging techniques to map brain functioning has been tested
effective also in gaining insights into people’s intentions, views and attitudes. For ex-
ample, scientists were able to infer from decoded brain activity which actions partici-
pants in their trial were intending to perform. The task in question was to decide
whether to add or subtract two numbers and to covertly hold their intention for a few
seconds. During that delay, it was possible for scientists to determine with 70% accur-
acy which of two tasks the subjects were covertly intending to perform (Haynes et al.
2007). In another study, participants toured several virtual-reality houses, and then had
their brains scanned while touring another selection. By identifying certain patterns of
brain activity for each house, scientists were able to determine which houses their sub-
jects had been to before (Smith 2013). Brain scans do not only allow to ‘read’ concrete
experiment-related intentions and memories. They appear even able to decode more
general preferences. A US study has shown that fMRI scans can be used to successfully
infer the political views of the users by identifying functional differences in the brains
of respectively Democrats and Republicans (Schreiber et al. 2013). Similarly, men’s
frequent preference for sport cars has been correlated with specific functional differ-
ences in the men’s vs the women’s brain (Baron-Cohen 2004).
The possibility of non-invasively identifying such mental correlates of brain func-
tional differences is of particular interest for marketing purposes. Over a decade ago,
McClure et al. (2004) used fMRI to show functional differences (increased activation in
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, hippocampus and midbrain) in the brain of people
knowingly drinking Coca Cola as opposed to the same people drinking unlabeled Coke.
Their results showed that marketing strategies (e.g. the Coca Cola label) can determine
different responses in the brain of consumers (McClure et al. 2004). These results have
pioneered the establishment of a spin-out branch of neuroscience at the intersection
with marketing research called neuromarketing, which has expanded rapidly over the
past decade. Today, several multinational companies including Google, Disney, CBS,
and Frito-Lay use neuromarketing research services to measure consumer preferences
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and impressions on their advertisements or products. In addition, a number of special-
ized neuromarketing companies including EmSense, Neurosence, MindLab Inter-
national and Nielsen, routinely apply neuroimaging techniques, mostly fMRI and EEG,
but also Steady State Topography (SST) and physiological measurements (e.g. galvanic
skin response) to study, analyze and predict consumer behavior. This possibility of min-
ing the mind (or at least informationally rich structural aspects of the mind) can be po-
tentially used not only to infer mental preferences, but also to prime, imprint or trigger
those preferences. For example, Neurofocus, an American multinational neuromarket-
ing company recently acquired by Nielsen, tested subliminal techniques with the pur-
poses of eliciting responses (e.g. preferring item A instead of B) that people cannot
consciously register (Penenberg 2011). These techniques included embedding stimuli
shorter 30 milliseconds, hence under the threshold of conscious perception. In view of
these developments, authors have stressed the need to establish ethical and legal stan-
dards for neuromarketing practices (Ulman, Cakar, and Yildiz 2015).
Brain imaging techniques were originally developed and are still mostly implemented
within the context of clinical medicine and neuroscience research. In recent years, however,
a number of neurotechnology applications have made their way onto the market and are
now integrated into a number of consumer-grade devices for healthy users with various
non-clinical purposes. The umbrella term usually used to encompass all these non-invasive,
scalable and potentially ubiquitous of neurotechnologies is “pervasive neurotechnology”
(Fernandez, Sriraman, Gurevitz and Ouiller 2015), a notion borrowed from the most wide-
spread notion of pervasive computing. Today, pervasive neurotechnology applications in-
clude brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) for device control or real-time neuromonitoring,
neurosensor-based vehicle operator systems, cognitive training tools, electrical and
magnetic brain stimulation, wearables for mental wellbeing, and virtual reality systems.
Most of these applications use EEG recordings to monitor electrical activity in the brain
for a variety of purposes including neuromonitoring (real time evaluation of brain function-
ing), neurocognitive training (using certain frequency bands to enhance neurocognitive
functions), and device control. EEG-based BCIs are being increasingly used as wearable ac-
cessories for a number of everyday activities including gaming, entertainment, and smart-
phone’s remote control. For example, companies Emotiv and Neurosky offer a large
assortment of wireless headsets for everyday use that can be connected to compliant smart-
phones and personal computers (Ienca and Haselager 2016). Brain-control can be used to
remotely control several types of devices and engage in several activities including gaming
and other forms of entertainment, marketing, self-monitoring and communicating.
The possibility of non-invasive brain control has raised the attention of the mobile
communication industry. Several leading companies including Apple and Samsung are
incorporating neurogadgets into the accessory assortments of their major products. For
instance, iPhone accessories such as the XWave headset already allow to plug directly
into compliant iPhones and read brainwaves. Meanwhile, prototypes of next-generation
Samsung Galaxy Tabs and other mobile or wearable devices have being tested to be
controlled by brain activity via EEG-based BCI (Powell, Munetomo, Schlueter, and
Mizukoshi 2013). In the light of these trends, Yuan and colleagues predicted that
neurodevices will gradually replace the keyboard, the touch screen, the mouse and the
voice command device as humans’ preferred ways to interact with computers (Yuan,
Hsieh, and Chang 2010).
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Not only neuroimaging devices and BCIs fit into the category of pervasive neurotech-
nology. Several electrical brain stimulators fit into this category too. Unlike neuroimag-
ing tools, neurostimulators are not primarily used for recording or decoding brain
activity but rather for stimulating or modulating brain activity electrically. Portable,
easy-to-use, consumer based transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) devices are
the most widespread form of consumer-grade neurostimulator. They are used in a num-
ber of low-cost direct-to-consumer applications aimed at optimizing brain performance
on a variety of cognitive tasks, depending on the brain region being stimulated.1 Recently,
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) - a magnetic method used to briefly stimulate
small regions of the brain for both diagnostic and therapeutic purposes, has also evolved
into portable devices, which resulted effective in the treatment of migraine (Lefaucheur et
al. 2014). Finally, an invasive surgical technique called deep brain stimulation (DBS)
involving the implantation of a neurostimulator in the ventrointermediate nucleus of the
thalamus has obtained FDA approval and is now increasingly used as a treatment for
essential tremor, Parkinson’s disease, dystonia and obsessive–compulsive disorder.
In sum, if in the past decades neurotechnology has unlocked the human brain and made
it readable under scientific lenses, the upcoming decades will see neurotechnology becom-
ing pervasive and embedded in numerous aspects of our lives and increasingly effective in
modulating the neural correlates of our psychology and behavior. While welcoming con-
tinuing progress in neurotechnology development, in this paper we argue that the ethical
and legal implications of the neurotechnology revolution should be considered early and
in a proactive manner. More in detail, we argue that the legal system has to be adequately
prepared to deal with the new challenges that might emerge out of emerging neurotech-
nology, in particular in the context of human rights. As neurotechnology advances, it is
critical to assess whether our current human rights framework is conceptually and nor-
matively well-equipped to face the novel challenges arising at the brain-computer-society
entanglement, hence to provide simultaneously guidance to researchers and developers
while providing protection to individuals and groups.
Brain technology and the law
Neuroscience and the law intersect on many levels and on various different issues. This
is not surprising. While neuroscience studies the brain processes that underlie human
behavior, legal systems are quintessentially concerned with the regulation of human be-
havior. It is therefore reasonable to claim that both disciplines are destined to be “nat-
ural partners” (Goodenough and Tucker 2010). The underlying idea of the new field
called ‘neurolaw’ is precisely that better knowledge of the brain will lead to better-
designed laws and fairer legal procedures. Examples of potentially legally relevant appli-
cations of neurotechnology are numerous. Brain imaging techniques, for instance,
might possibly contribute to more evidence-based decisions in criminal justice, from
investigation and the assessment of criminal responsibility, to punishment, rehabilita-
tion of offenders, and the evaluation of their risk of recidivism. The tools offered by
neuroscience could potentially play also a role in civil law procedures, for example, in
the assessment of an individual’s capacity to contract, or of the severity of the plaintiff ’s
pain in compensation claims. New and more reliable lie detection technologies based
on our knowledge of the brain functioning might help to assess the reliability of
witnesses. Memory erasure of recidivist violent criminals and of victims of especially
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traumatic offences (e.g. sexual abuse) is also mentioned as another possibility opened
by our new knowledge of the brain (Goodenough and Tucker 2010).
A possibly game-changing use of neurotechnology in the legal field has been illustrated
by Aharoni et al. (2013). In this study, researchers followed a group of 96 male prisoners
at prison release. Using fMRI, prisoners’ brains were scanned during the performance of
computer tasks in which they had to make quick decisions and inhibit impulsive reac-
tions. The researchers followed the ex-convicts for 4 years to see how they behaved. The
study results indicate that those individuals showing low activity in a brain region associ-
ated with decision-making and action (the Anterior Cingulate Cortex, ACC) are more
likely to commit crimes again within 4 years of release (Aharoni et al. 2013). According to
the study, the risk of recidivism is more than double in individuals showing low activity in
that region of the brain than in individuals with high activity in that region. Their results
suggest a “potential neurocognitive biomarker for persistent antisocial behavior”. In other
words, brain scans can theoretically help determine whether certain convicted persons are
at an increased risk of reoffending if released.
This prospect evokes Philip Dick’s 1956 science fiction story “The Minority Report”,
which was adapted into a movie in 2002. The plot is about a special police unit (“Pre-
crime Division”) which is able to identify and arrest murderers before they commit
their crimes. The system is believed to be flawless until an officer from that same unit
is mistakenly accused of a future murder (Dick 2002). This dystopian scenario, which
could result from the new knowledge about the brain, raises important ethical and hu-
man rights questions. How much evidence is needed to prove that brain scans are likely
to flag only the truly high risk offenders? Can neurotechnology-generated data, which
have a probabilistic nature, be straightforwardly applied to predict the criminal behav-
ior of a particular individual? Can these preliminary findings, which were based on a
very specific cohort, be generalized to other groups? In any case, it is clear that much
more work is needed to ensure the reliability of the technique before authorizing its
use by courts, certainly not as a substitute for current methods for dangerousness as-
sessment, but maybe as an additional, complementary tool.
Other brain technologies that may be relevant for the legal system are lie detectors,
mental decoders, and brain printers. Lie detectors are devices capable to record and
measure brain responses associated with the retrieval of memories, with the purpose of
ascertaining the truth-values of statements relative to those memories. Traditional lie
detectors, like the polygraph, measure some bodily markers such as blood pressure,
heart rate, and muscular reactions. Despite their low reliability, they are regularly used
by some government agencies to screen their employees. However, they are very rarely
accepted as evidence in US courts. The new generations of lie detectors, which are EEG-
based and fMRI-based, are regarded as much more reliable than the polygraph, as they
detect the lie at its source: the brain. In the United States, at least two companies -No Lie
MRI and Cephos Corp - are currently offering fMRI lie-detection services (Greely 2009).
A study published in 2005 by a research group linked to Cephos, claimed that fMRI-
based lie detection has a reliability of around 90%. The study predicted that the procedure
will be further improved and ready to be used in courts in the not too distant future
(Kozel et al. 2005). More recent studies have confirmed the higher reliability of fMRI-
based lie detectors compared to polygraphy (Langleben et al. 2016). In parallel, mental
decoders are capable of decoding mental states and translating them into observable
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outputs such as text, verbal signals or graphic images. For example, Herff et al. (2015) and
Mirkovic et al. (2015) have independently demonstrated the effectiveness of a decoder
capable of reconstructing speech from brain waves (Herff et al. 2015; Mirkovic, Debener,
Jaeger, and De Vos 2015). Such devices have a great potential for clinical applicability as
they could benefit several classes of neurological patients, especially those suffering from
locked-in syndrome and paralysis. Such patients, who might have lost their capacity to
produce verbal communication, would be enabled to re-interact with the external world
by producing speech solely by brain activity. Outside the clinical setting, such decoders
are tested to enhance mobile communication through thought-to-text converters. Not all
mental decoders are designed to enhance users’ autonomy. Some devices are currently
tested for monitoring brain states with the purpose of guiding the individual’s behavior.
For example, NASA and Jaguar are jointly developing a technology called Mind Sense,
which will measure brainwaves to monitor the driver’s concentration in the car (Biondi
and Skrypchuk 2017). If brain activity indicates poor concentration, then the steering
wheel or pedals could vibrate to raise the driver’s awareness of the danger. This technol-
ogy can contribute to reduce the number of accidents caused by drivers who are stressed
or distracted. However, it also opens theoretically the possibility for third parties to use
brain decoders to eavesdropping on people’s states of mind.
Similar implications are raised by brain printers. These are prototypical devices that
are currently tested as brain-based authentication methods. For example, researchers at
Binghamton University in the state of New York have devised a way to verify a person’s
identity based on how their brain responds to certain words. The researchers observed
the brain signals of 45 volunteers as they read a list of 75 acronyms, such as FBI and
DVD, and recorded the brain’s reaction to each group of letters, focusing on the part of
the brain associated with reading and recognizing words. It turns out that participants’
brains reacted differently to each acronym - so that a computer system was able to
identify each volunteer with 94% accuracy (Armstrong et al. 2015). This technology,
which could in the short term replace passwords and fingerprints as authentication tool
for personal accounts, raises novel privacy and security issues.
As neurotechnology advances and opens novel opportunities for monitoring and control-
ling cognitive function, there is uncertainty on how the law should cope with such advance-
ments. In particular, it remains debatable whether emerging trends in neurotechnology call
for a revision or even a replacement of existing legal concepts at various levels including
civil law, tort law, business law and legal philosophy. While increasing attention is being
devoted in the literature to emerging neurotechnology applications in the context of
criminal law or to the increasing use of neuroscience evidence in courts, little focus has
been directed to the implications of advancing neuroscience and neurotechnology for
human right law. This neglected component of the neurolaw discourse is of particular
relevance since the universal nature of the human right framework could provide a solid
foundation for this emerging ‘jurisprudence of the mind’.
Neuroscience and human rights
Overview
While neurotechnology has the potential to impact human rights such as privacy, freedom
of thought, the right to mental integrity, the freedom from discrimination, the right to a fair
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trial, or the principle against self-incrimination, yet international human rights law does not
make any explicit reference to neuroscience. In contrast to other biomedical developments,
which have already been the subject of standard-setting efforts at the domestic and inter-
national level, neurotechnology still largely remains a terra incognita for human rights law.
Nonetheless, the implications raised by neuroscience and neurotechnology for inherent
features of human beings, urge a prompt and adaptive response from human rights law.
The adaptive ability that human rights law has shown in responding to the challenges
posed by genetic technology may help to anticipate how this branch of law could evolve
in the coming years in response to new issues raised by neuroscience. Since the end of
the 1990s, the international community has made significant efforts to address a great
variety of issues that result from the increasing access to human genetic data. In 1997,
the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights (UDHGHR) was
adopted to prevent that genetic information is collected and used in ways that are in-
compatible with respect for human rights, and to protect the human genome from im-
proper manipulations that may harm future generations. The principles contained in
this instrument were further developed in 2003 by the International Declaration on
Human Genetic Data (IDHGD), which sets out more specific rules for the collection of
human biological samples and genetic data. It is interesting to note that from the inter-
action between genetics and human rights resulted entirely new rights, such as the
‘right not to know one’s genetic information’, which is formally recognized by the
UDHGHR (Art. 5(c)) and the IDHGD (Art. 10), as well as by other international and
national regulations. In addition to the recognition of new rights, ‘old’ rights -such as
the right to privacy and the right against discrimination- were specifically adapted to
the novel challenges posed by genetics. This close connection between life sciences and
human rights was further strengthened by the 2005 Universal Declaration on Bioethics
and Human Rights, which comprehensively addresses the linkage between both fields
(Andorno 2013). This latter document sets out principles that are applicable not only
to genetics but to other biomedical and life sciences issues.
In this paper we claim that, similarly to the historical trajectory of the ‘genetic revolu-
tion’, the ongoing ‘neuro-revolution’ will reshape some of our ethical and legal notions. In
particular, we argue that the growing sensitivity and availability of neurodevices will
require in the coming years the emergence of new rights or at least the further develop-
ment of traditional rights to specifically address the challenges posed by neuroscience and
neurotechnology. This argument is in accordance with the observation of how human
rights have historically emerged and developed in modern societies. Human rights, in fact,
have always arisen as specific responses to recurrent threats to fundamental human inter-
ests (Nickel 1987), to human dignity (Habermas 2010), or to what is required by a “min-
imally good life” (Fagan 2005). As we attempt to show in this paper, the individual quest
to exert control over one’s own neuro-cognitive dimension as well as the emergence of
potential threats to basic human goods or interests posed by the misuse or inadequate ap-
plication of neurotechnological devices may require a reconceptualization of some
traditional human rights or even the creation of new neuro-specific rights.
It goes beyond the scope of this article to discuss the different theories about the
foundations of human rights, or to take a position in this regard. For the purposes of
our investigation we chose to adopt a broad practical conception of human rights, like
the one proposed by Beitz (2011, p. 109), who argues that they are “requirements
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whose object is to protect urgent individual interests against predictable dangers
(‘standard threats’) to which they are vulnerable under typical circumstances of life in a
modern world order composed of states” (Beitz 2011). In general terms, it can be said
that the scope of human rights is to guarantee both the necessary negative and positive
prerequisites for leading a minimally good life (Fagan 2015).
A common objection against the recognition of new rights is that it leads to the
so-called ‘rights inflation’, which is the objectionable tendency to label everything that is
morally desirable as a ‘human right’. The unjustified proliferation of new rights is indeed
problematic because it spreads skepticism about all human rights, as if they were merely
wishful thinking or purely rhetorical claims. Rights inflation is to be avoided because it
dilutes the core idea of human rights and distracts from the central goal of human rights
instruments, which is to protect a set of truly fundamental human interests, and not
everything that would be desirable or advantageous in an ideal world.
A frequently accepted way to avoid rights inflation is to impose justificatory tests for
specific human rights. For example, according to Nickel (2014), it could be required
that a proposed human right should not only deal with some very important good but
also respond to a common and serious threat to that good, impose burdens on the
addressees that are justifiable and no larger than necessary, and be feasible in most of
the world’s countries (Nickel 2014). The international law scholar Philip Alston (1984)
has suggested a list of criteria that a given claim must satisfy in order to qualify as a
‘human right’ in terms of international law. In his view, the proposed new human right
must “reflect a fundamentally important social value”; “be consistent, but not merely
repetitive, of the existing body of international human rights law”; “be capable of
achieving a very high degree of international consensus”, and “be sufficiently precise as
to give rise to identifiable rights and obligations”.
For the reasons we give below, we think that the new rights advocated in this paper
− the right to cognitive liberty, the right to mental privacy, the right to mental integrity,
and the right to psychological continuity − fulfill these requirements and therefore do
not raise the risk of rights inflation.
This proposal of neuro-specific human rights is consistent with Glen Boire’s advocacy
of a “jurisprudence of the mind” that “takes account of the latest understandings of the
brain” and “which situates these within our country’s tradition of embracing individual,
self-determination and limited government” (Boire 2003, p. 10). As brain technology is
rapidly reshaping the infosphere and the digital infrastructures in our societies, there is
an urgent need to proactively assess whether our current ethical and legal frameworks
are ready to face this emerging scenario.
At this stage it is also worth noting that many of the issues discussed in this paper
are not unique to cutting-edge neurotechnology but have precedents in more trad-
itional interventions. For example, breaches for mental privacy emerged before the in-
vention of neuroimaging and neuromonitoring technologies through more rudimental
techniques such as interrogation and polygraph-based lie detection. These interven-
tions, however, do not target neural processing directly but only via proxy-processes
such as speech, behavior, and physiological indices (e.g. pulse and skin conductivity). In
addition, the degree of accuracy and resolution of such techniques is remarkably low
(Iacono 2008), hence often insufficient to support epistemologically justified inferences
about mental information. Similarly, threats to mental integrity and psychological
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continuity were posed by non-computational interventions such as psychoactive drugs
and hypnotic inductions way before the invention of neurostimulation and brain-
machine interfacing. However, these techniques are often characterized by limited
efficacy and reliability in purposively manipulating mental activity as well as low
degrees of selectivity in targeting neural processes. Based on these considerations, we
argue that advanced neurotechnology enables a degree of access into and manipulation
of neural processes significantly higher than other techniques. Therefore, while we con-
sider the ethical and legal analysis presented in this paper applicable to the entire
spectrum of both computational and non-computational brain interventions, we argue
that the degree of perturbation of advanced neurotechnology on the current ethical-
legal framework is quantitatively higher than non-computational techniques. For this
reason we situate neurotechnology as the focus of our proposed normative upgrade.
Cognitive liberty
A first, essential step towards the creation of a neuro-oriented human rights framework has
been the recent debate over the notion of cognitive liberty. According to Bublitz (2013), this
complex notion, often also referred to as mental self-determination, comprises two
fundamental and intimately related principles: (a) the right of individuals to use emerging
neurotechnologies; (b) the protection of individuals from the coercive and unconsented use
of such technologies. As he concisely put it, cognitive liberty is the principle that guarantees
“the right to alter one’s mental states with the help of neurotools as well as to refuse to do
so” (Bublitz 2013, p. 234).
Proponents of cognitive liberty suggest considering it a “fundamental human right” as well
as “a central legal principle guiding the regulation of neurotechnologies” (Ibid.). The reason
of its fundamental function stems from the fact that “the right and freedom to control one’s
own consciousness and electrochemical thought processes is the necessary substrate for just
about every other freedom” (Sententia 2004). In fact, as Bublitz argued, “it is hard to con-
ceive any conception of a legal subject in which the mind and mental capacities (e.g. acting
from reasons, deliberation) are not among its necessary constitutive conditions” (2013, p.
242). Cognitive liberty, therefore, is necessary to all other liberties, because it is their neuro-
cognitive substrate. As such, cognitive liberty resembles the notion of ‘freedom of thought’
which is usually considered the essential justification of other freedoms such as freedom of
choice, freedom of speech, freedom of press, and freedom of religion. Not surprisingly, Sen-
tentia (2004) presented cognitive liberty as a conceptual update of freedom of thought that
“takes into account the power we now have, and increasingly will have to monitor
and manipulate cognitive function”. Some legal scholars such as Boire and Senten-
tia have interpreted the right to cognitive liberty with special focus on the protec-
tion of individual freedom and self-determination from the State. For example,
Sententia has claimed that “the State cannot, consistent with the First Amendment
of the Constitution, forcibly manipulate the mental states, and implicitly the brain
states of individual citizens”.
Given its conceptual complexity, cognitive liberty is multi-dimensional. Bublitz recog-
nizes at least three “interrelated but not identical dimensions” (Bublitz 2013, p. 251).
These are: (i) the liberty to change one’s mind or to choose whether and by which
means to change one’s mind; (ii) the protection of interventions into other minds to
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protect mental integrity, and (iii) the ethical and legal obligation to promoting cognitive
liberty. These three dimensions configure cognitive liberty as a complex right which in-
volves the prerequisites of both negative and positive liberties in Berlin’s sense (Berlin
1959): the negative liberty of making choices about one’s own cognitive domain in absence
of governmental or non-governmental obstacles, barriers or prohibitions; the negative lib-
erty of exercising one’s own right to mental integrity in absence of constrains or violations
from corporations, criminal agents or the government; and finally, the positive liberty of
having the possibility of acting in such a way as to take control of one’s mental life.
Being the neurocognitive substrate of all other liberties, cognitive liberty cannot be
reduced to existing rights, hence is immune to the risk of rights inflation. In addition,
since cognitive life, although in various forms and degrees, is inherent in all human
beings, cognitive liberty is consistent with a definition of human rights as inalienable
fundamentals rights “to which a person is inherently entitled simply because she or he is a
human being” (Sepuldeva, Van Banning, and van Genugten 2004), regardless of their
nation, location, language, religion, ethnic origin or any other status. Consequently, its
integration into the human right framework would enable the protection of constitutive
features of human beings that are not being entirely protected by existing rights.
For the purposes of our analysis, in this article we will focus exclusively on the nega-
tive formulation of the right to cognitive liberty, namely as the right to refuse coercive
uses of neurotechnology. In addition, while we welcome the introduction of the right
to cognitive liberty, we argue that this notion is not sufficient alone to cover the entire
spectrum of ethical and legal implications associated with neurotechnology. Rather, the
establishment of cognitive liberty as a human right should be coordinated with a simul-
taneous reconceptualization of existing rights or even the creation of other new neuro-
specific rights. These are the right to mental privacy, the right to mental integrity and
the right to psychological continuity.
The right to mental privacy
The right to privacy
Today’s infosphere is more intrusive than at any other time in history. Websites regu-
larly use cookies to record store visitors’ information such as browsing activities, pref-
erences, personal data, visited pages, passwords, credit card numbers, etc. Big and
small corporations engage in data-mining activities that capture massive amounts of
data about users. Much of this information is about daily activities: what was pur-
chased, when, where and how much was paid. E-mail accounts are stuffed with adver-
tisements and unsolicited offers. Phone numbers and personal addresses are captured
in databases and sold to corporations and government agencies. In addition, video sur-
veillance, facial recognition technology, spyware are opening up people’s daily activities
for public consumption. As Moore (2010) puts it, today “informational privacy is every-
where under siege”.
The widespread availability of neurotechnology applications will provide multiple
opportunities for individuals to access and exert control over their brain-activity, hence
resulting in a number of potentially beneficial activities such as self-monitoring, neuro-
enhancement, and brain-controlled computer use. However, these same tools will
disseminate an unprecedented volume and variety of brain information outside the clinical
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domain and potentially increase the availability of such information to third parties. As
pervasive applications of neurotechnology are introducing brain data into the infosphere,
they are thereby exposing them to the same degree of intrusiveness and vulnerability to
which is exposed any other bit of information circulating in the digital ecosystem. At
present, no specific legal or technical safeguard protects brain data from being subject to
the same data-mining and privacy intruding measures as other types of information. In the
words of Nita Farahany, “there are no legal protections from having your mind involuntarily
read”.2 The reason for that stems from the fact, as Charo (2005) observes, that “technology
innovates faster than the regulatory system can adapt”.
A large number of ethical, legal, and social questions arise from these neurotechnolo-
gical possibilities. These include: For what purposes and under what conditions can
brain information be collected and used? What components of brain information shall
be legitimately disclosed and made accessible to others? Who shall be entitled to access
those data (employers, insurance companies, the State)? What should be the limits to
consent in this area?
Although a first attempt of response to these questions can be made by appealing to
existing legal norms, we claim that specific legal notions and provisions have to be devel-
oped. The first notion involved in these debates is that of privacy. International human
rights law formally recognises the right to privacy. The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR) states that “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation.
Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks”
(Article 12). Similarly, the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) stipu-
lates that “everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and
correspondence” (Article 8 para 1). It is interesting to note that the right to privacy is one
of the few rights that was recognized by international law as a broad, umbrella right be-
fore it was included in any state constitution (Diggelmann and Cleis 2014).
At the European level, the right to privacy recognized by the ECHR was developed by the
1995 EU Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC), which specifically aims at protecting individ-
uals with regard to the processing and transfer of personal data. Currently, the EU is
planning to adapt the data protection rules to the challenges to privacy posed by the new
digital environment. The overall goal of the upcoming Directive and Regulation is to
empower individuals with more control over their personal data.3 Also the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights, adopted in 2000, states the general right to protection of private life in
Article 7 and specifies in Article 8 that “everyone has the right to the protection of personal
data concerning him or her” (para 1). According to paragraph 2 of the latter provision,
“[s]uch data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the
consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law.
Everyone has the right of access to data which has been collected concerning him or
her, and the right to have it rectified”.
The first question that arises in the context of the current privacy protection stan-
dards is whether the traditional right to privacy also covers the data contained in and
generated by our minds. An answer to this dilemma is not immediately available, not
least because there is no consensus in the legal literature on a definition of privacy.
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This can be explained by the disparate content of this right, which includes not only
the right to control access to personal information, but also to our bodies and to spe-
cific private places. In their seminal article, published in 1890, Samuel Warren and
Louis Brandeis articulated the right to privacy as “a right to be let alone” (Warren and
Brandeis 1890). Their primary concern was the increasing interest of the yellow press
in gossiping and revealing personal information about individuals, including pictures of
private persons without their consent. This specific instance of privacy was further de-
veloped by Alan Westin and other authors into the broader notion of informational
privacy, i.e. the control over information about oneself. According to Westin, privacy
can be described in terms of our claim to determine for ourselves when, how, and to
what extent information about us is communicated to others (Westin 1968). Today, the
“right to be let alone” delineated by Warren and Brandeis more than one century ago
has clearly become relevant to areas far removed from their original concerns. The
various facets of the modern understanding of privacy continue to expand as techno-
logical developments continue. Neuroscience is very likely to become in the near future
one of the new areas in which the right to privacy is called to play a fundamental and
unexpected role.
The emergence of a right to mental privacy
Science fiction can be very helpful to anticipate the challenges that science and tech-
nology may pose in the future, as well as the possible responses to them. In a Star Trek
novel written in 1990, Captain Kirk has been informed that a dangerous spy has surrep-
titiously joined one of the groups that are visiting the spaceship Enterprise. Kirk desper-
ately wants to identify the intruder and to know more about him and his plans. By
appealing to one of his staff members who has telepath abilities, Kirk wants to read the
minds of all the visitors. However, the Captain is reminded by one of his assistants that,
according to the law, “the right to mental privacy is an inalienable right of all Feder-
ation citizens and shall not be abrogated without due process of law” (Mitchell 1990).
Moreover, “to find one guilty individual in either of those groups means there is a large
probability of invading the privacy of a number of innocent people” (Ibid., p. 150).
The kind of dilemmas described in this futuristic scenario, which is set in the 23rd-
century, may become a reality much earlier than expected. Developments in neuroim-
aging, like those mentioned above, have raised concerns about the ethics and legality of
‘mind-reading’. It is true that functional brain imaging cannot really ‘read’ thoughts,
but can only highlight differences between brain activations during different cognitive
tasks, and to infer from such differences certain conclusions about an individual’s
thoughts. However, the fact remains that, even if in an indirect manner, these new tools
are increasingly able to determine with a high degree of accuracy certain brain data that
belong to the private sphere and deserve to be protected from public scrutiny.
In modern societies, privacy and data protection norms cover the use and disclosure
of various kinds of personal information. Since the data decoded from an individual’s
brain can be regarded as ‘personal information’ − or ‘personally identifiable information’,
as it is called in the US−, there is in principle no reason why such data could not be
covered by existing privacy and data protection regulations. If one has a “reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy”4 regarding the identifying information derived from one’s blood or
saliva samples, surely one has a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding the data
decoded from one’s own mind (Shen 2013).
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However, the special nature of brain data, which relate very directly to one’s inner life
and personhood, and the distinct way in which such data are obtained, suggest that
specific safeguards will be probably needed in this domain. It should be noted that trad-
itional privacy rules seek to safeguard ‘external’ information about people.
The particularity of brain data is that the information to be protected is not easily
distinguishable from the source itself that produced the data: the individual’s neural
processing. This is what we can call the “inception problem”, which complicates the
analysis of the issues at stake when traditional approaches to privacy are used. In other
terms, the neurotechnological future we are approaching will require us to guarantee
protection not only to the information we record and share, but also to the source of
that information since they may be inseparable. In order to implement this we would
need wider privacy and data protection rights that can be also applied at a higher and
chronologically antecedent level: our neural activity.
An additional reason for concern about privacy in this domain is that brain signals allow
to distinguish or trace an individual‘s identity and are potentially linkable to that individ-
ual. Some brain records (e.g. EEG-recorded signals) can be used as a unique biometric
identifier, similarly to fingerprints or DNA. Back in 2007, Palanippan and colleagues
developed a EEG based biometric framework for automatic identity verification
(Palaniappan and Mandic 2007). Since then, a huge number of unobtrusive EEG-based
biometric systems have been developed for the purposes of individual recognition
(Campisi, La Rocca, and Scarano 2012; La Rocca, Campisi, and Scarano 2012), person
authentication (Marcel and Del Millan 2007; Palaniappan 2008), and person identification
(Brigham and Kumar 2010; Mohammadi, Shoushtari, Molaee Ardekani, and Shamsollahi
2006). However, unlike other identifiable information, brainwaves can be potentially
recorded without individual’s awareness, and therefore in absence of a real ability of the
person to consent to the collection and use of that information. With the growing market
of portable EEG-based neuroheadsets and in absence of a real possibility for obtaining
informed consent for the processing of the records they generate, there is a need for the
law to lay down new protective responses to the processing of brain data. The need to
protect information generated below the threshold of voluntary control demands for the
recognition of a new right that is specifically tailored on the characteristics of brain infor-
mation and the new possibilities opened by mind-reading technologies.
In the light of the emerging neurotechnologies, it is also necessary to explore the
-technical and legal - possibility of applying a filter to the flow of brain information
with the purpose of distinguishing the information we consciously want to keep private
from the one we want to disclose publicly. In the current information society we are
constantly required to draw a distinction between private and public information: for
example, when we set up the contact page on our website or when we decide with
whom to share our mobile phone number. The basic psychological assumption that
underlies this phenomenon is that competent adults have the psychological capacity to
consciously filter the information flow and reasonably identify the bits of information
that must be kept private. Privacy, in fact, is both a right and an ability. As an ability, it
enables individuals or groups to seclude themselves, or information about themselves,
and thereby express themselves selectively. This idea has been widely imported into the
information technology sphere, where privacy is often described as the ability (or per-
ceived ability) to control submitted personal information -especially when using the
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Internet (Dinev and Hart 2004). In order to exercise this ability meaningfully we need a
rational medium that is capable to filter the information flow and decide what to dis-
close. This medium is thought, as well captured by the famous adagio in computer se-
curity “the best anti-virus software is the brain”.
Based on these specific challenges, we argue that current privacy and data protection
rights are insufficient to cope with the emerging neurotechnological scenarios. Conse-
quently, we suggest the formal recognition of a right to mental privacy, which aims to
protect any bit or set of brain information about an individual recorded by a neurodevice
and shared across the digital ecosystem. This right would protect brainwaves not only as
data but also as data generators or sources of information. In addition, it would cover not
only conscious brain data but also data that are not (or are only partly) under voluntary
and conscious control. Finally, it guarantees the protection of brain information in
absence of an external tool for identifying and filtering that information. In short,
the right to brain privacy aims to protect people against illegitimate access to their
brain information and to prevent the indiscriminate leakage of brain data across
the infosphere.
It is worthy of mention that violations of mental privacy can occur also in absence of
direct intrusion into the victim’s neural processing. For example, brain data collected for
research purposes are usually stored for analysis on externally located EEG-databases and
repositories. Similarly brain-data generated by consumer-grade brain-computer interfaces
(BCI) are sent to a connected app and can be stored in the cloud or other data store end
points. In either case, these data can be accessed also in absence of the person who gener-
ated those data and without intervening into the person’s brain signaling.
Is the right to mental privacy an absolute or a relative right?
Most human rights, including privacy rights, are relative, in the sense that they can be
limited in certain circumstances, provided that some restrictions are necessary and are a
proportionate way of achieving a legitimate purpose.5 In specifically dealing with the right
to privacy, the European Convention on Human Rights states that this right admits some
restrictions “for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others” (Art. 8, para 2). Only
very few rights, such as the freedom of thought, freedom from slavery, torture and in-
human or degrading treatment or punishment are regarded by international human rights
law as not subject to any exceptions and, therefore, as absolute rights. In which of both
categories should the right to mental privacy be placed? Can nonconsensual intrusions
into people’s brain data be justified in certain circumstances or should be unconditionally
banned? More concretely, does the right to mental privacy protect individuals from being
compelled by courts or the state to brain-based interrogations?
Paul Root Wolpe has suggested that due to fears of government oppression, we
should draw a bright line around the use of mind-reading technologies:
“The skull should be designated as a domain of absolute privacy. No one should be
able to probe an individual’s mind against their will. We should not permit it with a
court order. We should not permit it for military or national security. We should
forgo the use of the technology under coercive circumstances even though using it
may serve the public good” (Wolpe 2009).
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Similarly, it has been argued that “nonconsensual mind reading is not something we
should never engage in” (Stanley 2012). The claim is that mind-reading techniques con-
stitute “a fundamental affront to human dignity” (Ibid). Consequently, “we must not let
our civilization’s privacy principles degrade so far that attempting to peer inside a per-
son’s own head against their will ever become regarded as acceptable” (Ibid).
Are these calls for an unconditional ban on compulsory mind-reading justified? Or
could this procedure be acceptable in certain circumstances (for instance, when faced with
a serious crime or a terrorist attack)? As mentioned above, privacy rights are not absolute,
but relative. The collection, use and disclosure of private information is permissible when
the public interest is at stake. For example, in many jurisdictions, compulsory genetic
testing can be undertaken to attempt to identify criminal offenders. Considering the non-
invasive and painless nature of brain-scans, there are prima facie good reasons for think-
ing that their nonconsensual use would be justified, with a court warrant, under special
circumstances when there are reasonable grounds to believe that an individual has com-
mitted a serious crime or is involved in the planning of a serious crime.
However, this dilemma becomes more intricate when it is seen not in connection to
privacy issues, but in the light of the principle of prohibiting coerced self-incrimination. This
problem particularly arises when the results of brain scans are regarded not as mere
information about individuals (such as buccal or blood-derived DNA, fingerprints, etc.), but
as a testimony because in this latter case the self-incrimination clause would enter into play.
The ban on coerced self-incrimination is widely recognized across the democratic
world as being an integral component of a fair criminal justice. This privilege is a logic
consequence of the presumption of innocence, which places the burden of proof of
guilt on the prosecution. In other words, people suspected of a crime do not have any
obligation to assist in providing evidence against themselves. The privilege against self-
incrimination is very closely related to the right to remain silent and can overlap with
it. However, there is a conceptual difference between them: while the former concerns
the threat of coercion in order to make an accused yield certain information, the latter
concerns the drawing of adverse inferences when an accused fails to testify or to answer
questions (Ashworth 2008).
This privilege is enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
which stipulates that “in the determination of any criminal charge against him, every-
one shall be entitled (…) not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess
guilt” (Art. 14(3)(g)). A similar provision can be found in the American Convention on
Human Rights and in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.6 Although
the European Convention on Human Rights does not explicitly refer to the privilege
against self-incrimination, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has repeat-
edly asserted that this principle is implied in the general right to a fair trial, which is
guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention.7 In the US, the Fifth Amendment protects
against “coercion [to] prove [a] charge against an accused out of his mouth”. Interpret-
ing this clause, the US Supreme Court introduced in 1966 the distinction between be-
ing compelled to provide real or physical evidence (which is allowed) and being forced
to give self-incriminating testimony (which is forbidden).8
The ECtHR draws a more subtle distinction when it differentiates between compel-
ling “real evidence which has an existence independent of the will of the suspect” (ex.
documents acquired pursuant to a warrant, breath, blood and urine samples and bodily
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tissues for the purpose of DNA testing) and evidence which is not truly “independent
of the will of the suspect”.9 Answers to questions are the most obvious examples of this
second category because they are inconceivable without the will of the subject.
However, in the case of Funke v. France, the ECtHR has considered that also being
compelled to produce certain documents (in the case, bank statements from accounts
in foreign banks, and which might serve to incriminate the individual for tax evasion),
would amount to an infringement of the privilege.
Therefore, the lecture of the privilege made by the ECtHR can been understood in the
sense that the key issue is not so much whether the evidence is real or oral (i.e. physical
as opposed to answers to questions), but whether the evidence requires the active co-
operation of the individual or not (Redmayne 2007). In other words, “the privilege only
covers assistance from the suspect which could not be substituted by employing direct
force” (Trechsel 2005).
If we accept this understanding of the privilege, the question then becomes whether the
mere record of thoughts and memories -without any coerced oral testimony or declar-
ation- is evidence that can be legally compelled, or whether this practice necessarily re-
quires the ‘will of the suspect’ and therefore constitutes a breach of the privilege against
forced self-incrimination. Unfortunately, it is extremely difficult to give a clear-cut answer
to this dilemma. In our opinion, the issue has to be the matter of public discussion in
order to find an adequate balance between the private and public interests at stake. The
dilemma is particularly arduous because, on the one hand, it could be argued that
thoughts and memories are purely internal operations that per se cannot be forced, and
consequently the non-incrimination clause would not be applicable to them. However, on
the other hand, if mind-reading techniques are allowed in criminal proceedings, there is
in the long term the risk to completely water down the privilege against self-
incrimination, especially if the techniques become more reliable and efficient than they
are at present. People might still be formally protected against self-incriminatory oral
statements, but not against the very source of such testimonies: their own thoughts. As
Nita Farahany (2012) puts it, self-incrimination may occur silently just as aloud.
The right to mental integrity
Intrusions into people’s brains cannot only result in a violation of their mental privacy,
but may also have a direct impact on their neural computation and result in direct harm
to them. Ienca and Haselager (2016) have introduced the notion of malicious brain-
hacking to refer to neurocriminal activities that influence directly neural computation in
the users of neurodevices in a manner that resembles how computers are hacked in com-
puter crime. Focusing on brain-computer interface (BCI), they identify four types of mali-
cious brain-hacking based on the various levels of the BCI cycle where the attack can
occur. Three of these types, i.e. when the attack occurs at the level of measurement, de-
coding and feedback, may involve direct manipulation of a person’s neural computation.
Malicious agents may add noise or override the signal sent to the device with the purpose
of diminishing or expunging the control of the user over the application, or even hijacking
the victim’s voluntary control. For example, a criminal actor could override the signal sent
by the users and hijack the BCI-controlled device (e.g. smartphone, electronic wheelchair)
without the user’s permission.
Ienca and Andorno Life Sciences, Society and Policy  (2017) 13:5 Page 17 of 27
In this kind of cases, the users’ mental privacy and the protection of their brain data
are not the only rights at risk. Rather, the physical and mental integrity of the victim
are at stake too. In fact, the forced intrusion into and alteration of a person’s neural
processes pose an unprecedented threat to that person’s mental integrity.
The right to personal physical and mental integrity is protected by the EU’s Charter of
fundamental rights (Article 3), stating that “everyone has the right to respect for his or
her physical and mental integrity.” Understandably, the Charter emphasizes the import-
ance of this right in the fields of medicine and biology, because of the direct impact that
biomedical technologies may have on people’s physical and mental integrity. The
provision focuses in particular on four requirements: free and informed consent, the non-
commercialization of body elements, and the prohibition of eugenic practices and human
reproductive cloning. No explicit reference is made to neurotechnology-related practices.
This silence is understandable if we consider that the Charter was adopted in 2000, when
the discussion on the ethical and legal implications of neuroscience was at a very early
stage. Today however, potential applications of neurotechnology open the prospects of
impacting personal integrity in a manner that is comparable to that of genetics and other
biomedical practices. For this reason, the normative framework should keep up with neu-
rotechnological advances and extend the protection of people’s integrity to this new area.
We propose to fill this normative gap by calling for a reconceptualization of the right to
mental integrity. In fact, while the ECHR and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights con-
sider mental integrity as a right to mental-health, pendant of the right of physical integrity
understood as physical health, a more complex dimension of mental integrity is elicited
by neurotechnology. Mental integrity in this broader sense should not only guarantee the
right of individuals with mental conditions to access mental health schemes and receive
psychiatric treatment or support wherever needed. In addition to that, it should also guar-
antee the right of all individuals to protect their mental dimension from potential harm.
This reconceptualized right should provide a specific normative protection from po-
tential neurotechnology-enabled interventions involving the unauthorized alteration of
a person’s neural computation and potentially resulting in direct harm to the victim.
For an action X, to qualify as a threat to mental integrity, it has to: (i) involve the direct
access to and manipulation of neural signaling (ii) be unauthorized –i.e. must occur in
absence of the informed consent of the signal generator, (iii) result in physical and/or
psychological harm. As neurotechnology becomes part of the digital ecosystem and
neural computation rapidly enters the infosphere, the mental integrity of individuals
will be increasingly endangered if specific protective measures are not implemented.
Threats to mental integrity do not limit to malicious brain-hacking and similar illicit
activities. Unauthorized alterations of a person’s neural computation could also emerge
out of military applications of BCI technology for warfighter enhancement. Lebedev et
al. have described that a neurologically controlled prosthetic could send tactile informa-
tion back to the brain in nearly real time by using intracortical microstimulation
(ICMS), essentially creating a “brain-machine-brain interface” (Lebedev et al. 2011).
Such interventions may directly modify neurological activity and can be used to exert
some degree of control over ground troop soldiers. For example, the Committee on
Opportunities in Neuroscience for Future Army Applications of the National Research
Council of the National Academies has investigated the use of portable technologies
such as near infrared spectroscopy (NIRS) to detect deficiencies in a warfighter’s
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neurological processes and utilizing transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to suppress
or enhance individual brain processes (National Research Council 2009). Similarly, mental
integrity rights should be included among the rights of war prisoners to prevent the use
of invasive brain-washing interventions.
Brain stimulation is an additional domain where the right to mental integrity may
play a role. With the growing number of portable neurostimulators available on the
market or assembled do-it-yourself devices, the risk that people may misuse these de-
vices with consequent negative impact on their neural functioning should be avoided.
For example, while consumer-grade transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) are
designed to safely function in a certain frequency band, little safeguards prevent users
or third persons from manipulating the device’s frequency.
The medical domain is not exempt from the possible application of the right to mental
integrity. Invasive neurotechnology interventions such as deep-brain stimulation (DBS)
involve the alteration of the patient’s neural processing by electrode-delivered electrical
impulses. While this procedure provides therapeutic benefits for otherwise treatment-
resistant neurological patients, there is also the potential for neuropsychiatric adverse-
effects including apathy, compulsive behavior and hallucinations (Mackenzie 2011). In
addition, being a surgical procedure, there is a risk of infection, bleeding and rejection of
the implanted neurostimulator. Therefore, although in such medical procedure informed
consent is always obtained based on minimal medical ethics requirement, still there is a
risk that the alteration of neural computation enabled by DBS may cause a disproportion-
ate harm as compared to the therapeutic benefit. This high potential for adverse effects is
the reason why, although having proved some effectiveness in the treatment of conditions
such as obesity and anorexia nervosa, DBS is still not approved by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) for the treatment of those conditions. In this context, mental integ-
rity rights stand to prevent from harm, absolutely conceived, but to prevent to a dispro-
portionate relative harm compared to the potential therapeutic benefit.
Finally, the growing field of memory engineering will likely represent a paramount
challenge to the right to mental integrity. Several techniques have been developed to
engineer (e.g. boost or selectively erase) memories from a person’s mind. For example,
Nabavi and colleagues used an optogenetics technique to erase and subsequently re-
store selected memories by applying a stimulus via optical laser that selectively
strengthens or weakens synaptic connections (Nabavi et al. 2014). While they have not
reached yet the level of human experimentation, these findings may hold big potential
for the treatment of such diseases as Alzheimer’s and post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD). At the same time, however, the misuse of these techniques by malevolent
actors may generate unprecedented opportunities for mental manipulation and brain-
washing. For example, criminally motivated actors could selectively erase memories
from their victims’ brains to prevent being identified by them later on or simply to
cause them harm. On the long term-scenario, they could be used by surveillance and
security agencies with the purpose of selectively erasing dangerous, inconvenient from
people’s brain as portrayed in the movie Men in Black with the so-called neuralyzer.
The potential motives of illicit memory alteration are various, including increasing
national security or exerting control over individuals or groups.
Like the right to mental privacy, also the right to mental integrity may not be absolute.
For example, it might be argued on utilitarian grounds that controlled and temporary
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violations of the right to mental integrity should be allowed as a form of moral enhance-
ment for persistent violent offenders. For example, Persson and Savulescu (2008) have
argued that if safe and effective biomedical moral enhancements were developed then
they should be compulsory (Persson and Savulescu 2008). Similarly, Ellegaard and Kragh
(2015) have argued that it is not only morally permissible, but morally required to force
persistent violent offenders to undergo morally enhancing treatments provided the dem-
onstrated effectiveness of such interventions. These possible exceptions to the right to
mental integrity would obviously require broad societal discussion to determine whether
–and when– such compulsory manipulations of the deepest dimension of the self could
be justified for the greater benefit of society.
While taking a position in the long-standing debate over moral enhancement is be-
yond the scope of this paper, it is important to consider that the postulation of the
rights to mental privacy and mental integrity does not ipso facto implies the absolute
character of these new rights.
The right to psychological continuity
In addition to mental privacy and mental integrity, also people’s perception of their own
identity may be put at risk by inadequate uses of emerging neurotechnology. As we have
seen in the first section, neural devices can be used not exclusively for monitoring brain
signals but also for stimulating or modulating brain function. For example, transcranial
direct current stimulation (tDCS) devices apply constant, low current delivered to the
brain area of interest via electrodes on the scalp with the purpose of modulating brain
function. Since it causes neuron’s resting membrane potential to depolarize or hyperpolar-
ize, this stimulation causes alterations in brain function that are potentially beneficial for
patients. Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) and deep brain stimulation (DBS)
open the possibility of intervening into brain function even more substantially. Given the
increasing therapeutic effectiveness of tDCS, TMS and DBS, and the rapid advancement
of the technology, brain stimulation devices are likely to expand to wider psychiatric
groups and, in the case of the first two ones, also to the general population.
However, changes in brain function caused by brain stimulation may also cause unin-
tended alterations in mental states critical to personality, and can thereby affect an individ-
ual’s personal identity (Decker and Fleischer 2008). In particular, it has been observed that
brain stimulation may have an impact on the psychological continuity of the person, i.e. the
crucial requirement of personal identity consisting in experiencing oneself as persisting
through time as the same person (Klaming and Haselager 2013). Several cases have been
reported in the scientific literature in which DBS has led to behavioral changes such as
increased impulsivity and aggressiveness (Frank, Samanta, Moustafa, and Sherman 2007;
Sensi et al. 2004) or changes in sexual behavior (Houeto et al. 2002). A study involving
patients treated with DBS showed that more than half of them articulated a feeling of
strangeness and unfamiliarity with themselves after surgery (“I do not feel like myself
anymore”; “I feel like a robot” or “I have not found myself again after the surgery”)
(Schüpbach et al. 2006). More recent studies have evidenced personality changes in the direc-
tion of increased impulsivity (Lewis et al. 2015; Pham et al. 2015). In parallel, memory engin-
eering technologies may impact a person’s identity by selectively removing, altering, adding
or replacing individual memories that are relevant to their self-recognition as persons.
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Surely it is an empirical question to determine the frequency and magnitude of these
psycho-behavioral changes and it is a question for criminal and tort law to assess the
impact of these changes on liability and responsibility. But the question we are inter-
ested in here is whether such personality changes induced by neurostimulation or
memory manipulating technology could constitute in some circumstances a violation
of a basic human right. This might theoretically be the case, for instance, if the patient
is legally incompetent (for instance, a child) and the personality change turns out to be
psychologically disturbing for him or her. In such circumstances, if the patient’s legal
representatives refuse to consent to the removal of the device on the grounds that it
has reduced the neurological disorder symptoms, they could be regarded as acting
against the individual’s right to psychological continuity.
However, threats to this right are more likely to happen outside clinical settings. For
instance, in the context of intelligence and military agencies, it has been reported that
over the last decades violations of human rights might have taken place in experiments
involving brain electrodes, LSD, hypnosis, the creation of Manchurian candidates,10 the
implantation of false memories and induction of amnesia. Many of these experiments
were conducted on unwitting civilians and in the absence of any external review, or
representation for the experimental subjects, or any meaningful follow-up (Ross 2007).
The new knowledge and technologies in the field of neuroscience clearly offer new and
more efficient possibilities for carrying out unconsented personality changes. For ex-
ample, Pycroft et al. (2016) recently reported the concern that brain implants like DBS
are vulnerable to attack by third parties who want to exert malicious control over the
users’ brain activity. They called this risk of modification of a person’s brain activity
through unauthorized use of neurodevices by third parties ‘brainjacking’ (Pycroft et al.
2016). Negative consequences of brainjacking include (i) information theft, which
would result in a violation of the right to mental privacy; (ii) cessation of stimulation,
draining implant batteries, inducing tissue damage, and impairment of motor function,
which would result in violations of the right to mental integrity. However, some pos-
sible consequences of brainjacking such as alteration of impulse control, modification
of emotions or affect, induction of pain, and modulation of the reward system could be
achieved even in absence of any violation of mental privacy and integrity. In those cir-
cumstances of unauthorized modification of the cognitive-emotional-affective dimen-
sion a different type of human right violation seems to be at stake: the violation of the
right to psychological continuity.
In short, the right to psychological continuity ultimately tends to preserve personal
identity and the coherence of the individual’s behavior from unconsented modification
by third parties. It protects the continuity across a person’s habitual thoughts, prefer-
ences, and choices by protecting the underlying neural functioning. As Paul Tiedemann
points out, we understand ourselves as personal unities and as subjects and source of
attitudes as long as these attitudes have a minimum level of coherence. This is why a
serious lack of coherence makes it impossible to understand oneself (Tiedemann 2016).
The right to psychological continuity can be seen as a special neuro-focused instance of
the right to identity. The right to identity was developed by the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR) from the right to private life included in Article 8 of the European
Convention on Human Rights.11 As we have seen in the first section, Article 8 protects
against unwanted intrusion and provides for the respect of an individual’s private space.
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However, privacy and personal identity should be distinguished. What the right to psycho-
logical continuity aims to prevent is not the unrestricted access to brain information but
the induced alteration of neural functioning.
The UDHR also addresses the right to have and develop a personality. Article 22
states: “Everyone is entitled to the realization of the rights needed for one’s dignity and
the free development of their personality.” In addition, Article 29 states: “[e]veryone
has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his per-
sonality is possible.” According to Mănuc (2012), personality rights can be defined as
those expressing the quintessence of the human person, and are intrinsic to being hu-
man. In here analysis, these rights recognize the “spirit” within an individual and have
developed from the issues of privacy. It is questionable, however, if current personality
rights are well-equipped to address the problem of stimulation-induced alterations in
one’s personality.
However, it is questionable whether current personality rights can fully account for
the threats posed to psychological continuity. In fact, while this family of rights protects
the translation of mental states into action, psychological continuity guarantees protec-
tion at an antecedent level: at the level of raw neural functioning. In the risk scenario
presented above, misused brain stimulation does not impact the link between mental
processes and action, i.e. the expression of mental states, but the mental processes
themselves. To provide this more intimate level of protection, there is a need for a new
right that preserves the continuity of a person’s mental life from external abusive alter-
ation or disruption.
The right to psychological continuity is closely related to the right to mental integrity,
and may factually overlap with it. Both rights stand to protect people from abusive and
unconsented alterations of their mental dimension. However, they differ to the extent
that the right to psychological continuity also applies to emerging scenarios that do not
directly involve neural or mental harm. In contrast, as we have seen in the previous
section, the presence of harm is a necessary condition for an action to qualify as an
offence to a person’s mental integrity.
To appreciate this difference, it is important to consider that psychological continuity
could be threatened not only by misused brain stimulation but also by less invasive, even
unperceivable interventions. A good example is unconscious neural advertising via neuro-
marketing. As we have seen in the first section, neuromarketing companies are testing
subliminal techniques such as embedding subliminal stimuli with the purpose of eliciting
responses (e.g. preferring item A instead of B) that people cannot consciously register.
This has raised criticism among consumer advocate organizations, such as the Center for
Digital Democracy, which have warned against neuromarketing’s potentially invasive tech-
nology. Jeff Chester, the executive director of the organization, has claimed that “though
there has not historically been regulation on adult advertising due to adults having defense
mechanisms to discern what is true and untrue”, it should now be regulated “if the adver-
tising is now purposely designed to bypass those rational defenses” (Singer 2010). We
argue that a right to psychological continuity can provide the conceptual basis be a viable
solution to overcome the problems addressed by Chester.
Potential threats that could be prevented by the right to psychological continuity also
include new forms of brain-washing. Holbrook et al. (2016) used transcranial magnetic
stimulation (TMS) to neuromodulate the brain regions responsible for social prejudice
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and political and religious beliefs. Their results show that by temporarily turning off
the posterior medial frontal cortex via TMS it was possible to make participants more
positive towards criticisms to their country, than the participants whose brains were
unaffected. Using the same technique, they could enhance the participants’ belief in
afterlife. While their experiment was designed to mapping the precise neural mechanisms
of high-level attitudes and beliefs, their results show that the same technique could be
used to trigger a wide spectrum of alterations of a person’s attitudes and beliefs. Malicious
agents, for example, could use neuromodulation to exert malevolent forms of mind con-
trol. These potentially include religious leaders and coordinators of religiously inspired
terrorist groups who want to achieve effective indoctrination and recruitment of young-
sters, as well as leaders of authoritarian regimes who want to enforce political compliance
and prevent rebellion. More mildly, marketing companies could use these techniques to
modulate customers’ preferences and attitudes towards their products.
Just like the previous two rights, it is a matter of discussion whether the right to psy-
chological continuity should be considered absolute or relative. It could be argued that
some neurotechnologically-induced personality changes could be tolerated with regard
to persistent violent offenders (for instance, serial rapists, killers and pedophiles). The
need to protect the public from potentially dangerous individuals who are very likely to
reoffend if released would justify such measures. This would even be a good alternative
for those individuals themselves, who could avoid in this way spending their whole lives
in prison. However, extreme caution and broad public discussion is imperative before
authorizing such intentional intrusions into people’s personality.
Conclusions
The volume and variety of neurotechnology applications is rapidly increasing inside
and outside the clinical and research setting. The ubiquitous distribution of cheaper,
scalable and easy-to-use neuroapplications has the potential of opening unprecedented
opportunities at the brain-machine interface and making neurotechnology intricately
embedded in our everyday life. While this technological trend may generate immense
advantage for society at large in terms of clinical benefit, prevention, self-quantification,
bias-reduction, personalized technology use, marketing analysis, military dominance,
national security and even judicial accuracy, yet its implications for ethics and the law
remain largely unexplored. We argue that in the light of the disruptive change that
neurotechnology is determining in the digital ecosystem, the normative terrain should
be urgently prepared to prevent misuse or unintended negative consequences. In
addition, given the fundamental character of the neurocognitive dimension, we argue
that such normative response should not exclusively focus on tort law but also on foun-
dational issues at the level of human right law.
In this context, we have suggested that emerging trends in neurotechnology are eliciting
coordinate amendments to the current human right framework which will require either
a reconceptualization of existing human rights or even the creation of new neuro-specific
rights. In particular, we have argued that emerging collateral risks associated with the
widespread use of pervasive neurotechnology such as malicious brain-hacking as well as
hazardous uses of medical neurotechnology may require a reconceptualization of the right
to mental integrity. In fact, although mental integrity is protected by the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights (Article 3), this right is conceptualized as a right to accessing and
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protecting mental health and is complementary to the right to physical integrity. We sug-
gest that in response to emerging neurotechnology possibilities, the right to mental integ-
rity should not exclusively guarantee protection from mental illness or traumatic injury
but also from unauthorized intrusions into a person’s mental wellbeing performed
through the use of neurotechnology, especially if such intrusions result in physical or
mental harm to the neurotechnology user.
In addition to such reconceptualization, we have argued that the creation of neuro-specific
rights may be required as a coping strategy against possible misuses of neurotechnology as
well as a form of protection of fundamental liberties associated with individual decision-
making in the context of neurotechnology use. With this respect, we have endorsed the recog-
nition of a negative right to cognitive liberty as a right for the protection of individuals from
the coercive and unconsented use of such technologies. In addition, as a complementary solu-
tion, we have proposed the recognition of two additional neuro-specific rights: the right to
mental privacy and the right to psychological continuity. The right to mental privacy is a
neuro-specific privacy right which protects private or sensitive information in a person’s mind
from unauthorized collection, storage, use, or even deletion in digital form or otherwise. In
contrast to existing privacy rights, the right to mental privacy stands to protect information
prior to any extra-cranial externalization (e.g. in verbal or printed format) as well as the gener-
ator of such information (a person’s neural processing). As such, it protects a person’s mental
dimension as the ultimate domain of information privacy in the digital ecosystem. In coordin-
ation with that, the right to psychological continuity will protect the mental substrates of per-
sonal identity from unconscious and unconsented alteration by third parties through the use
of invasive or non-invasive neurotechnology.
All these proposed neuro-focused rights are mutually linked and stand in an intimate
family relationship. Being the substrate of all other freedoms, cognitive liberty in its
positive sense is a prerequisite of all other neuro-focused rights. As such, it is to mental
privacy, mental integrity and psychological continuity in a very similar relation as free-
dom of thought is to privacy, integrity and identity rights. However, in its negative
sense of protection from coercive use, cognitive liberty can only partly account for un-
intended uses of emerging neurotechnology. In fact, illicit intrusions into a person’s
mental privacy may not necessarily involve coercion, as they could be performed under
the threshold of a persons’ conscious experience. The same goes for actions involving
harm to a person’s mental life or unauthorized modifications of a person’s psychological
continuity, which are also facilitated by the ability of emerging neurotechnologies to
intervene into a person’s neural processing in absence of the person’s awareness.
This proposal of neuro-specific human rights in response to emerging advancements in
neurotechnology is consistent with and a logical continuation of the proposal of develop-
ing genetic-specific human rights in response to advancements in genetics and genomics
as set out by the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights
(UDHGHR) and the International Declaration on Human Genetic Data (IDHGD).
Extensive future debate is required to test the normative solidity of this proposed expansion
of the human right framework to the neurotechnology dimension. In parallel, future research
is required to investigate the implications of such proposed human rights on other levels of
law such as international humanitarian law, criminal law, tort law, property law and consumer
law. Ideally, this debate should benefit from the active and cross-disciplinary participation of
legal experts, neuroscientists, technology developers, neuroethicists and regulation bodies.
Ienca and Andorno Life Sciences, Society and Policy  (2017) 13:5 Page 24 of 27
Endnotes
1For example, the website The Brain Stimulator offers a wide assortment of affordable
tDCS devices, with prices ranging between 60$ and 200$. See: https://thebrainsti-
mulator.net/shop/
2Speech at Panel on “What If: Your Brain Confesses?” World Economic Forum -
Annual Meeting, Davos, 20–23 January 2016. Available at: https://www.weforum.org/
events/world-economic-forum-annual-meeting-2016/sessions/what-if-your-brain-confesses
3See http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/reform/index_en.htm
4The expression “reasonable expectation of privacy” was coined by the US Supreme
Court in 1967 to distinguish legitimate police searches and seizures from unreasonable
ones in the light of the Fourth Amendment that protects privacy rights.
5“In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limita-
tions as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect
for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public
order and the general welfare in a democratic society” (UDHR, Article 29.2).
6American Convention on Human Rights, art. 8(2)(g): “Every person accused of a crim-
inal offense has the right (…) not to be compelled to be a witness against himself or to
plead guilty”; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 55(1)(a): “In respect of
an investigation under this Statute, a person: (a) Shall not be compelled to incriminate him-
self or herself or to confess guilt”. Paragraph 2(b) of the same Article 55 adds that the per-
son suspected of having committed a crime has the right “to remain silent, without such
silence being a consideration in the determination of guilt or innocence”.
7Funke v. France, ECtHR 1993, A n° 256-A; John Murray v. United Kingdom,
ECtHR 1996-I.
8US Supreme Court, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
9Saunders v. United Kingdom, ECtHR 1996-VI, para 69.
10The expression “Manchurian candidate” refers to “a person who is (or is believed
to be) brainwashed into becoming a subversive agent, especially an assassin” (Oxford
Dictionary). The expression was popularized by the 1962 film The Manchurian
Candidate, adapted from the 1959 novel of the same name by Richard Condon.
11Goodwin v United Kingdom ECtHR (2002) 35, 18 at 90.
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